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Concerning the preſent State of Affairs at HOME and ABROAD.

By a true Lover of the People.

The THIRD EDITION.

LONDON:

Printed for T. COOPER, at the *Globe* in *Pater-Noſter-Row*, 1740.

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Foxwell
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SIR,

IT is very poſſible you may be under ſome Surprize, at receiving from me a Letter on the State of the Nation, who very lately, as well as on all other Occaſions, refuſed to concur with many of your Conſtituents in framing Inſtructions for the Direction of your Conduct in the next Seſſion of Parliament. There is you know a wide difference between inſtructing and informing, between enjoining you to follow other Mens Opinions, under the higheſt Penalty,

nalty, that of forfeiting the Eſteem of your Country, and modeſtly laying before you the Sentiments of a private Freeholder, with which you are deſired to concur, no farther than as what ſeems reaſonable to him, appears alſo in the ſame Light to you. This is true *Engliſh* Liberty, Liberty of perſwading by Argument, not by Force.

Though the Diſtinction I have made is certainly ſufficient to juſtify me, in your Opinion, on the Subject of this Addreſs; yet deſigning, as I do, to deal freely and candidly with you in all things, I will join to this Apology for now writing, my Reaſons for not then inſtructing; to the end you may be convinced that I act in all things from Principle, not from any particular Humour, or Party-View, much leſs through any Venal Influence, an Imputation ſome Men, with what Juſtice God only knows, would bring upon the whole Nation.

There have been many Attempts made of late Years to confound our Notions, as to the Relation between us, and thoſe we ſend to Parliament. Abundance of new Terms have been introduced, ſuch as Deputies, Attornies, Agents, which are very far from expreſſing what we ought to conceive of a Member of Parliament, and which is very juſtly and clearly explained by the legal Term *Repreſentative*. A Repreſentative is

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one to whom I give a Power of judging for me in certain Matters for a certain Time; and this, I take it, is the Power veſted in every Member of the Houſe of Commons.

Thoſe who are fond of having you called Deputies, either do not underſtand that Word, or elſe prevaricate in the Uſe they make of it. The Deputies from the *Dutch* Provinces are by no means to be compared with our Members of Parliament; for this plain and ſhort Reaſon, that the Government of our Neighbours is a Democracy, whereas hitherto ours is not ſo. Amongſt them, the Legiſlative Power, and the Executive Power, are both in the Hands of the People; but becauſe they cannot manage it themſelves, therefore they entruſt certain Individuals to act in the Name, and by the Authority of the People, in ſuch and ſuch Diſtricts. Theſe are properly Deputies, mere Creatures, and abſolute Dependants on the People, in Virtue of the Conſtitution.

As to Attornies and Agents, they are by no means equivalent to Members, becauſe we appoint them ſpontaneouſly, inveſt them with what Powers we think fit, and diveſt them of thoſe Powers when we think proper. They are indeed our Repreſentatives in what they do; but then it is entirely in our Power to limit what they ſhall do. On theſe Accounts therefore, they differ eſſentially from

Members of the Houſe of Commons, who though they are indebted for their Places to our Choice, yet owe the Powers they are inveſted with to the Conſtitution.

According to the Frame of our Government, whereby all Sorts of Political Rights amongſt us are ſettled, the Executive Power is ſolely in the King, and the Legiſlative in Him, and his two Houſes of Parliament. In him by Law is veſted the Power of calling Parliaments, which he does by directing Writs to the Peers, who repreſent themſelves, and by iſſuing his Writs to the Sheriffs of the reſpective Counties in the united Kingdoms, commanding them to return ſuch Perſons as legal Electors, in a legal Manner, chuſe for their Repreſentatives. This is the Right by which the Members of the Houſe of Commons ſit, and by which, thoſe who chuſe them give them that Right; nor is there any thing difficult to comprehend in the whole of this Tranſaction.

But with Reſpect to the new-claimed Right of Inſtructing, there are to me inſuperable Difficulties in accounting for it, in ſuch a Manner, as to make it conſiſtent with our Conſtitution. The Reaſon of calling a Parliament is, becauſe the King deſires the Advice of his Lords, and the Concurrence of his People; ſo it is in the Writs, ſo it is in fact, and ſo it always was. Now, that the

People

People ſhould ſend Perſons to repreſent them in the Aſſembly where the arduous Affairs of the Nation are to be debated and decided, is, as I ſaid before, eaſily underſtood; but how they ſhould inſtruct them, as to Matters which themſelves cannot legally know any thing about, is what I am at a Loſs to comprehend. If the Inſtructions given to our Members are binding, how are they our Repreſentatives, ſince we, if we were preſent, would be free Agents; and, on the other hand, if our Inſtructions are not binding, to what Purpoſe do we inſtruct?

There is no Man living more attach'd to the Conſtitution, more tenacious of the Subjects Rights, or more a Friend to Liberty, than I: But could I, as a Lover to the Conſtitution, enter into a Meaſure no way warranted thereby? Could I, with my Eyes open, pretend to claim that as a Right, which I ſaw to be no Right? Or could I, as a Friend to Liberty, pretend to abridge the Freedom of my Repreſentative, and take from him, as far as in my Power lay, a Capacity of acting according to the Dictates of his Conſcience? No; Sir, I could not, and therefore I did not: I left you the Liberty I now exerciſe, and all I expect from you is, that you would ſpeak and vote as freely in your Capacity as I write in mine.

To me this new, this anti-conſtitutional Practice of inſtructing, ſeems a mere Juggle; the Member firſt tranſmits his Notions to his Creatures, and then they, under the Name of his Conſtituents, inſtruct him, as he firſt inſtructed them. Theſe, Sir, are Artifices of a dangerous Nature, and may for ought I know, prove deſtructive of our Conſtitution. The Law is the great Security we have for our Lives, our Liberties, and Properties, and he who deſires me to act againſt, or without Law, on any Occaſion, deſires me to give away, as far as in me lies, that great Security I mention.

As I have now ſet down ſuccinctly, and ſincerely, Motives which hindered me from acting, as many of your Conſtituents did, in the Buſineſs of inſtructing, I will now as fairly, and freely tell you, why at this Time I addreſs you in this publick Manner, and that too, on the very ſame Subjects to which their Inſtructions relate. I know you gave a good Reception, though not bound to it, to them; Yet I know not what Reception you will afford this Letter from me; but I know it is my Buſineſs to deſerve a good one.

It is impoſſible for a Man, who makes any Pretences to Religion, Virtue, or Honeſty, not to have a deep Concern for the Intereſt of his Country, and it is equally impoſſible

poſſible for him to have this Concern, and yet continue ſilent, where he has a Right, and a Power, of delivering his Sentiments, and the Intereſt of his Country is viſibly at ſtake. A warm Senſe of the former, and a ſincere Belief of the latter, induced me to ſet Pen to Paper: I think, Sir, that the Conſtitution at home, the Glory, the Trade of the Nation abroad, are at preſent in ſome Danger; and therefore, Sir, I think I have the ſame Right to addreſs myſelf to you, that a Member of an Inſurance-Office has, to call to a Fire-man, when he has Reaſon to imagine that his Houſe may be burnt.

But I am very ſenſible that ſome have affected to repreſent both Church and State in danger, when there was not the leaſt Cauſe. To ſhew you, Sir, I am not of this Number, I will tell you bluntly what thoſe things are, which have occaſioned my Fears. I am apprehenſive there are ſome Men amongſt us, who, under Pretence of promoting a *Place-Bill*, aim at altering, if not ſubverting, the Conſtitution; and who, with an apparent Zeal for carrying on the preſent War, harbour in their Hearts a ſecret Intention of thwarting all thoſe Meaſures, by which only it can ſucceſsfully be purſued. Theſe are Apprehenſions I have long cooly conſidered, and am confident they are not groundleſs. But that I might do all that a private Man could

could do towards preventing thoſe Miſchiefs I thought I foreſaw: I drew up the Reaſons which inclined me to this Opinion, and preſent them firſt to you, as a Member of Parliament, and my Repreſentative, and next to the Publick. Now, let their Fate be what it will, let them be thought forcible or frivolous, worthy of Scorn, or worthy of Notice, I am eaſy, I have done my Duty!

My Reaſons are theſe:

We are told by ſome, who think themſelves great Politicians, that though we, the People of *Great Britain*, are in no danger from the Prerogative, that is, the legal Power of the Crown, yet are we in imminent Peril from its Miniſterial Influence. The Revolution it ſeems, which took away the Sting of the former, created the latter; ſo that getting rid of one Miſchief, we gave birth to another, and to be quit of this, the ſole Remedy they ſay is a *Place-Bill.* I will not take upon me to decide ſo knotty a Queſtion as this, between the Crown and the People. In my private Opinion, I do not think we are in any Danger from the Power of the Crown, take that Phraſe in what Senſe you will: In this Caſe however I ſhall content myſelf with proving, that if there really was ſuch a Danger, a *Place-Bill* is by no

no Means calculated to avert it, though it will certainly bring upon us a great many real Evils, much worſe than that they would introduce it to avoid, though this perhaps ſubſiſts only in their Imaginations.

If this Bill ever paſſes into a Law, though the Pretence is to bridle the Regal Power, yet it's firſt Operation muſt be upon the Subject; for the enacting Clauſe will diſable not the King from giving Places, but the People from chuſing ſuch as he has given Places to. If the Crown had any Power of obtruding Place-Men on the legal Electors, it would be but juſt to take away this Power; but ſince the People are already at Liberty, either to elect, or let it alone, it is certainly a little ſtrange, that they ſhould be made to demand an Abridgment of this Power, ſince this implies a groſs Abſurdity, *viz.* that Liberty may be increaſed, by being diminiſhed. We know, with all the Certainty that an hiſtorical Truth can be known, that the *Daniſh* Nobility were compelled by the People to give up all their Privileges to the Crown; we ought therefore to be cautious of Practices of this Nature, becauſe we ought to conceive the Liberties of the *Britiſh* Nation inviolable even by themſelves.

It would have had an odd Appearance, Sir, had you been told in your Inſtructions, that your Conſtituents were conſcious of

having too much Freedom, and therefore in pure Humility of Heart, and prudent Principles of political Self-denial, intreated you to give your Vote for the Abridgment of their Liberty, in a certain Inſtance, where they were conſcious they could not make a right Uſe of it. This, I ſay, would have looked ſomewhat ſtrangely, and yet read your Inſtructions over again, you will find this to be the Senſe of them, in what Words ſoever it may be expreſſed. Thus it ſeems a free People may be brought to caſt away their Freedom, under pretence of enlarging or ſecuring it. Alas! Alas! what Security can we have, when we ourſelves are afraid of being free?

But there is a Spirit of Corruption abroad, and this makes ſuch a Meaſure neceſſary. Strange, that a Spirit of Corruption ſhould do more than the Spirit of God, and change the very Eſſence of Things, make Reſtraint Freedom, and Freedom Reſtraint! Bills of Attainder have been always looked upon with ſome Degree of Horror; and yet, ſuch at preſent is the Infatuation of the People, that they call for an Act to attaint themſelves; for no Law of this Nature can paſs, without declaring the whole Nation to be corrupted, which is another Abſurdity; for no corrupt Nation would ever declare itſelf ſo. But we muſt go all Lengths to ſerve the Purpoſes of a Party,

a Party, we muſt tye our own Hands, to have them more at Liberty, and in order to become free, we muſt declare ourſelves unworthy of Freedom. O, that theſe were Flights of Fancy, mere Figures of Rhetorick, and not a modeſt Repreſentation of our Country's Nakedneſs!

To make this Proceeding ſtill the more abſurd, there is no Evidence offered to ſupport this Bill. The Nation pleads guilty to the blackeſt of all Charges, that of being univerſally venal, and no wonder when the People are brought to prefer this Charge againſt themſelves. But as this is no Law hitherto, I may enquire who brings this Charge, and on this Enquiry I find that it is a Set of Men, who on all legal Diviſions have been found the Minority. Upon what Teſtimony then do they proceed? Do they know this to be a Fact from any thing that falls under their immediate Notice? Far from it, they aſſert themſelves free from Corruption in the ſame Breath they condemn the Nation of it. Do the Majority own it? No, they deny it in the moſt ſolemn Manner: On a ſtrict Inquiſition therefore, it is as clear as ſuch a thing can be, that the very Ground of this Complaint is falſe, and that this Law, if ever it becomes one, will carry a Lye in it's Preamble, as well

as a judicial Sentence of Ignominy on the *Britiſh* People.

From this View of the intended Remedy, I think it may be concluded, that it is more likely to become a Poiſon, and therefore in common Prudence, we ought not to be over haſty in taking it down. We know very well, that there have been Reigns, wherein the Rights we now enjoy were not only controverted but denied. There is no need therefore of Hurry in pruning away ſuch Branches of Freedom as we think uſeleſs; it is not impoſſible that our Poſterity may incline to wiſh for thoſe Privileges which we want to cut off; and if they ſhould, they will certainly find it not ſo eaſy to regain, as we may to reſcind. Men who pretend to have ſuch Eſteem for the Conſtitution, as thoſe do who are eager for this Bill, ſhould methinks be more tender of meddling with it; and while they continually exaggerate their Attention to Conſequences, it would be but decent to pay a greater Reſpect to their Offspring than this Project does, ſince, for ought I have heard, it is to be of a perpetual, and not of a temporary Nature; ſo that either they believe themſelves infallible, or elſe care not what their Children ſuffer through their obſtinate Miſtakes.

Thus you have my firſt Objection to the Bill, *viz.* that it is needleſs and unnatural

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in it's full Extent; neither ought you to wonder if I am a little heated, ſince I am actually under as great a Concern, leſt my Country ſhould ſuffer from this new deviſed Specifick, as your Friends pretend it to be, leſt their Strength and Vitals ſhould be conſumed by what they call Corruption. If after weighing what I have ſaid, you think me in the right, my Warmth will ſtand in no need of Pardon; but if you ſhould think me in the wrong, let the Senſe of your own Reſentment excuſe it. As there can be no true Love without Jealouſy, ſo there can be no real Patriotiſm without a quick Senſation of our Country's Injuries; or, which is the ſame thing, of whatever we eſteem ſuch. A neceſſary Caution this; and now let me proceed to my ſecond Objection.

As this Excluſion Scheme of our new Patriots does not appear to be deeply founded in Reaſon, ſo nothing can be clearer, than that it is directly contrary to Experience. Our Fore-fathers had amongſt them wiſe and zealous Patriots, (witneſs their framing *Magna Charta*, and obliging the Clergy to read it after Divine Service) theſe Patriots underſtood our Conſtitution, and were ſo firmly attached to it, that they frequently ventured their Lives and Fortunes for it's Sake; yet, ſo far were they from thinking of any Expedient like this, that, as I ſhall preſently

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ſhew, they took a Method directly contrary, and ſought to preſerve the People's Liberties, by providing that the King's Place-Men, ſhould be ſuch as had Seats in Parliament.

The Ground they went upon was this, they ſuppoſed, that ſuch as were poſſeſſed of Property, would always have Regard to Property; and therefore in the great Struggle under King *Henry* III, the main Point in debate was, whether the King ſhould name his chief Officers, or whether they ſhould be named to him by Parliament. This was alſo endeavoured at in all ſucceeding Diſputes, ſuch as thoſe in the Reigns of *Ed.* II, and *Rich.* II, which is a Proof that our Forefathers for a long Courſe of Years were of the ſame Opinion, and thought it extremely dangerous to the People, that there ſhould be ſo much as a Poſſibility of the King's bringing Strangers and Men without Property into Places. In the Reign of *Hen.* VIII, when the Commons took up Arms in the Maintenance of what in thoſe Days was ſtiled Liberty, they amongſt other Articles of Complaint exhibited this, that the King had about him many mean Counſellors, Perſons of low Birth, and who had little Intereſt in their Country. To this the King penned an Anſwer with his own Hand, wherein he clearly and diſtinctly refuted the Charge, ſhewed that it was rather the Scandal

dal of his Father's Reign than of his own; and thereby made it appear that in this Point his Judgment went along with the Commons. Nay, ſo late as in the Time of *Charles* I, the ſame Demand was ſet up, and is one of the nineteen Propoſitions ſent to the King at *York*; ſo that we have full Evidence that this was the conſtant Opinion of our wiſeſt Stateſmen, and moſt ſteady Patriots for ſeveral hundred Years; and though no Age is infallible, yet it ſeems to ſavour of Preſumption, when we aſſert, that ſo many great Men ſhould want common Senſe for ſo long a Tract of Time.

Neither is it any Anſwer to what has been alledged, that there were fewer Place-Men in thoſe Days than now, and that there is no Intent to exclude by this Bill any of the great Officers of State, becauſe the Reaſon upon which theſe Patriots went, extended to all Place-Men, and is diametrically oppoſite to the Reaſon of this Bill. They argued that the Servants of the State were the Servants of the King and People; and that therefore they ſhould be ſuch as were ſome Way connected with the People, as well as dependent on the Prince. Now this is and muſt be the Caſe of all Place-Men, and therefore the Reaſoning of our Fore-fathers affects them all, and we act directly againſt their Sentiments, when we

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make it a Point to exclude theſe Men from Seats in Parliament, under a Notion of ſecuring thereby the Liberty of the Nation, and the Independency of the Houſe of Commons.

That trite Pretence, that we are more corrupt than our Anceſtors, and that, conſequently, ſome neceſſary Changes muſt be made, to accommodate our Government to the Ends it is to anſwer, does by no Means account for the Change attempted in this particular. If, as a Nation, we are more corrupt, then I do not ſee why we ſhould ſuppoſe ſuch as ſet up for Patriots now, to be either wiſer, or better, than the Patriots of former Times; and if they are not, why ſhould we not rather adhere to the old Plan ſketch'd out to us by the ſame Hands, whereby our Conſtitution was traced, which in Words at leaſt, even our modern Patriots confeſs to be excellent. They who built the whole Houſe may be preſumed to have judged beſt of all it's Apartments: And, I think, it is no ill Wiſh, that our modern State-Architects may not, by their Experiments, bring an old Houſe upon their Heads, and ours; becauſe, if they do, it is ten to one it may beat out many a Man's Brains.

I am well enough aware of another Anſwer, that may be thought totally to enervate the Force of this Objection, and to

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ſhow you that I have conſidered it; and that I neither ſeek to deceive myſelf, nor you, I will give it all it's Force. It may be ſaid, that Place-Men would not be dangerous in Parliament, if they were choſen by the People. That this was the Senſe of our Anceſtors, and that, if we will abide by it, we muſt take the whole of what they propoſed. But obſerve, Sir, that as Experience juſtifies one Part of this Propoſition, ſo it overturns the other. We are to follow our Anceſtors in what is right, and we are to leave them where they were viſibly in the wrong. This is the true Uſe of Experience; for to follow old Methods blindly, is to fall under the Tyranny of Cuſtom.

The chuſing the great Officers of the Kingdom, in Parliament, or by the People, had a very fair Appearance, and ſo we need not wonder, that it generally found Friends. But when it came to be put in Execution, it has been everlaſtingly found impracticable; ſuch Officers aſſuming to themſelves a Power, equally inconvenient to King and People. An Inſtance will make this familiar: Sheriffs were eligible by the Freeholders in every County, by the Common Law; ſo they continued all the Time of the *Saxons*, but by Degrees, ſuch Inconveniencies were found, in this Manner of conſtituting ſuch Officers, that by a Statute in the 9th of

Edw. II. commonly called *The Statute of Sheriffs*, it is enacted, *That the Sheriffs ſhall be aſſigned by the Chancellor, Treaſurer, Barons of the Exchequer*, &c. So that we ſee, our Anceſtors were wiſe enough to ſecure their Liberties, by giving up ſuch Powers, as were dangerous to them, when carried into Execution.

Thoſe who, in the Days of *Charles* I, were for reviving this Claim, in all Probability, knew well enough the Inconveniencies attending it; but their View was to get the Government into their Hands, which they were reſolved to alter. Mr *Hampden*'s firſt Scheme was to be Governor to the Prince, in which, if he had ſucceeded, this Alteration, no doubt, was to have been promoted by the Power of the Crown; but failing in that, he had Recourſe to the Parliament, and finding there a Number of Perſons of the ſame Spirit, who were deſirous of trying their Skill, as Legiſlators: this was among the Number of their Projects. That, in the main, they might intend the People well, is what I will not diſpute; but this I am ſure of, that if any Miniſter, of the moſt upright Intentions in the World, endeavoured any ſuch Alterations, even by Authority of Parliament, he would go near to be thought a Traitor, if he did not ſuffer as ſuch. It muſt therefore be a Maxim with all ſuch as

deſign

deſign to ſubvert this Conſtitution, that they ſet up for Patriots.

I would not be thought to inſinuate any kind of Slander; becauſe I deſpiſe, and abhor it. But theſe general Cautions are neceſſary, as appears from the Conduct of thoſe Gentlemen, who argue on the Side of the Bill. They tell you, that Duty, Loyalty, and Affection to our Prince, are Terms frequently miſ-applied, and that therefore, we ought to be upon our guard, leſt artful Men ſhould, by a Train of fine Words, lead us to fulfil their foul Purpoſes. Thus far I agree with them; and all I here offer is with the very ſame View, to prevent Men from promoting bad Things, out of Reſpect to good Words. The Rule is general, that the Corruption of the beſt Things produces the worſt; and I am ready to allow, that nothing is more certain, than that Exceſs of Loyalty begets a Proneneſs to Slavery; except that too fierce a Zeal for Liberty hath a natural Tendency to produce Confuſion.

I have now done with my Second Objection, wherein I have laboured to make it plain, that our modern Patriots may poſſibly be miſtaken. I come now to my laſt Objection, which, in few Words, is this; that we may poſſibly be miſtaken in our modern Patriots; and my Reaſon is, becauſe I ſee this Bill in quite another Light than

you do. You take it for a well-intended Scheme, a ſtrong Barrier to Liberty, and a Project entirely calculated for the Profit of the People; whereas, if I ſee right, it is an artificial Blind, ſet up to ſcreen ſecret Purpoſes, a Scheme dangerous to the People, if not deſtructive to Freedom; and which, in the End, will be found to give ſuch a vaſt Acceſſion of Power to the Crown, as will leave us no Hopes, but in the perſonal Virtues of the Prince who wears it; which, if his preſent Majeſty were immortal, might appear a feeble Objection; but is, otherwiſe, the ſtrongeſt that can be made.

There is certainly nothing more apparent in our Political Syſtem, than that the Health of our Government conſiſts in the Union of it's ſeveral Branches. A three-fold Cord owes it's Strength to it's being twiſted, and if we intend to break it, ſeparating does the Buſineſs. While the King of *Great Britain* and his two Houſes of Parliament are on good Terms amongſt themſelves, we have Peace at Home, and Reſpect abroad; but when once any Differences ariſe among them, civil Diſſenſions quickly induce foreign Contempt, and exactly in the ſame Proportion that we diſturb and diſtreſs each other, we are ſlighted and diſregarded by our Neighbours. When our Kings, *John*, *Edward* II, *Richard* II, aimed at making themſelves

themſelves abſolute, our Country was a Field of Blood, and our Nation made no Figure in *Europe*. It was the ſame Caſe when the Barons ſtruggled with King *Henry* III, and when Factions ſet up now a Prince of the Houſe of *Lancaſter*, and then a King of the Houſe of *York*. But under the Reigns of *Edward* III, and Queen *Elizabeth*, when the Parliament concurred with the Crown, the People confided in it too; whence it comes to paſs that theſe appear the brighteſt Times in Story.

In ſhort, whenever we have ſuffered, it has been either from weak Princes conceiving that themſelves and their Families might be aggrandized at the Expence of the People, or from the Peoples being taught to apprehend, that whatever leſſened the Power of the Crown muſt contribute to their Happineſs. Inſtances of both might be given from the *Engliſh* Hiſtory, but the Point is ſo univerſally agreed on, that I think they would be needleſs. In reſpect to Felicity, the Relation between a Prince and his Subjects, is the ſame as between a Maſter of a Houſe and his Family, whatever benefits one can never injure the other; and a want of Attention to this Maxim muſt ſooner or later deſtroy both.

Yet this Place-Bill, whenever it paſſes into a Law, will eſtabliſh both a nominal and a

real

real Difference between the Intereſts of the King and of his People. It will enact that ſuch as ſerve one ſhall not be capable of ſerving the other, and this at the ſame Time that it is confeſſed that to ſerve either well we muſt ſerve both. By this Bill ſuch as are in the Service of the Crown will be marked out as Enemies to their Country, at leaſt to their Countrymen and Fellow-ſubjects; for if they were Friends, why ſhould they be excluded from repreſenting them, a Right allowed to all Lay-Subjects by the Common Law, except ſuch as were excommunicated or outlawed? Hitherto when ſuch a Diſtinction as this had ſubſiſted a while, Men ſaw their Errors, and, in Reſpect to their Country, united again. But this Law will prove a Wall of Diviſion which private Men can never throw down; it will eſtabliſh a perpetual Diſtinction, and when it is paſſed we may date from thence as the Æra of Diſſenſion.

How monſtrous a thing muſt it appear to any human and rational Perſon, to hear of a Law eſtabliſhing an unnatural Diſtinction. It has been declared over and over, that the intruſting the Crown with the executive Power, is for the Uſe and Benefit of the People. Can any thing then be plainer, than that ſuch as the Crown employs in the executive Part of the Government, are in reality Servants

to the People. Are they not taken from amongſt the People? Are they not provided for by the People? How ſtrange a thing then to cut them off from the People for that which in Reaſon ought more cloſely to unite them? Perhaps it will be ſaid they are already divided. Yet this never can be proved; if it was ſo, it would be a great Misfortune; and to remedy this, muſt we enact they ſhall never come together again?

Some People are apt to fancy that there is a viſible Inconſiſtency between a Perſon's receiving a Truſt from the People and a Salary from the Crown, whereas there is nothing more agreeable to our Conſtitution. Is not the Money of the Crown, the Money of the Publick? Are not all publick Officers, Servants of the Publick? Where then is the Inconſiſtency of a Man's enjoying a Poſt of Profit, with a Poſt of Honour? Did not Members of Parliament antiently receive Wages for their Service in Parliament? And is not their receiving Salaries in Right of their Places the ſame thing in other Words, while thoſe Places are beſtowed by a King in the Intereſt of his People? Or do our dutiful Patriots think the publick Money the worſe, becauſe it paſſes through the Hands of the King? If indeed Patriotiſm was ſo prevailing, as that all Men would ſerve their Country in every Capacity for nought, then giving

Places

Places to Parliament-Men would be a Hardſhip, becauſe it would be impoſing double Offices on the ſame Men. But while Things are as they are, ſure it is a Mark of publick Spirit in the Prince to prefer ſuch as his People favour.

Beſides, being converſant in Buſineſs is a mighty Advantage to a Senator. A Man abſolutely unacquainted with publick Affairs, I mean unacquainted with the Management of them, will be but badly qualified to judge of the Conduct of thoſe who do manage them, let him be ever ſo converſant with Books, or endowed by Nature with ever ſo great Abilities. Such a Secluding of Senators from other publick Offices is not to be juſtified, either from the antient Hiſtories of *Greece* and *Rome*, or from the modern ones of *Venice* or *Genoa*. I confeſs it is not the Invention of our Patriots, it came originally from *Cromwell* and his Independants, who made uſe of this very Artifice to deſtroy both King and Parliament, and to ſacrifice the Intereſts of the Publick to the Views of a Handful of private Men.

The great End ſaid to be propoſed by the Law, is to heighten the Luſtre of Parliament; but this, like the reſt, is a mere Pretence; ſince whoever will conſider the Thing with Patience, and without Prejudice, muſt perceive, that nothing can be more

more deſtructive than this Scheme to the Authority of Parliament. Hitherto a Seat in Parliament was judged the moſt reaſonable Road to Preferment, and juſtly, for when a Man has ſerved his Country at his own Expence, he merits a Reward; but if this Law ſhould once take place, there will be an End of theſe Hopes, and ſuch as are beſt qualified will be leaſt inclined to ſerve their Country in Parliament. At preſent, this Apprehenſion may be ridiculed; but if ever we are ſo unhappy, as to judge of this Caſe by Experience, I dare pawn my Life, it will not be found a Miſtake.

On the other hand, all ſuch as are in Places, will now be more than ever dependent on the Crown, and it's Miniſters; becauſe they will then have no other Hopes, but from them. This Law will create to them a ſeparate Intereſt, and point out to them ſeparate Views. Inſtead of that Love and Veneration, which they now have for Parliaments, becauſe they have the ſame Relation to them with other People, they will for the future behold them with Apprehenſion and Diſlike; whence there muſt neceſſarily flow continual Jealouſies, and endleſs Diſturbances; for both, no doubt, will be able to form ſtrong Parties, and neither will ever want plauſible Pretences. It is without Queſtion a diſagreeable Office I have taken

upon me; but ſince I have taken it, I muſt perform it, even though theſe Repreſentations ſhould not be altogether void of Offence.

In the Number of odd Things this Law, when it ſhall be one, muſt bring to paſs, this will not be the leaſt; that the People, at one and the ſame Time, ſhall declare their higheſt Reſpect for a certain Set of Men, and yet puniſh them, though innocent, with the greateſt Severity. For can there be a greater Mark of Confidence, than chuſing them their Repreſentatives; and can there well be a greater Puniſhment, than to diſable a Man well qualified from ſerving his King and Country in an active State. How much Pride was the Houſe of Commons wont to take, in returning thanks to their own Members, for Services done by them to the Nation, in other Capacities! What muſt we therefore think of a Law, which renders this impoſſible for the future? Can we believe that it will add to the Glory, or to the Authority of that Aſſembly? We muſt have a ſtrong Faith, or a very weak Eye-ſight if we do.

From what has been ſaid, I think, it appears paſt doubt, that ſuch a Law as is now contended for, would create everlaſting Jealouſies between the Legiſlative and Executive Powers, and conſequently give birth to a continual Oppoſition. The Members of the

Houſe

Houſe of Commons are now very numerous, and if very few, who have Places, were allowed to ſit there, ſome amongſt them might be tempted to revenge this Diſtinction, by taking every Occaſion to vex thoſe, who were in Poſſeſſion of them; and ſuch a Proceeding as this would naturally excite Heart-burnings and Uneaſineſſes, among ſuch as were in continual Danger; not from their Actions, but from the Spheres in which they were obliged to act.

We know, that as ſoon as the ſelf-denying Ordinance took place in the long Parliament, which began about an hundred Years ago, and which we are obliged to mention, becauſe it is the only Parallel to the Caſe before us, theſe Miſchiefs actually did happen, theſe Diſputes ſprang up; but the Struggle was of no long Continuance, the Executive Power was, as it always will be, too ſtrong for the Legiſlative, when weakened and impaired by ſuch Laws; and ſo Force became Authority. Thoſe were miſerable Times for the People in general, and no very good ones for thoſe, who, by ſuch Arts, acquired Poſts in a diſtracted State, to which they never could have riſen in a well-governed Republick: and yet, ſad as thoſe Times were, ſome Men ſeem to wiſh them here again, if their Practices be any Comment on their Intentions. It depends wholly on the Virtue and Pene-

tration of the Majority of our Repreſentatives, whether they ſhall, or ſhall not, be diſappointed in their Expectations, and whether we ſhall ſuffer as deeply as our Anceſtors, from the Craft and Cant of pretended Patriots.

Our preſent Condition, could we be content with it, is that alone whereby we are protected from all Apprehenſions of this Sort. While Miniſters of State, while the Officers of the Crown, while thoſe who command our Armies, are in the ſame State with other Citizens, have the ſame Intereſt, and are capable of the ſame Honours; we have no juſt Reaſon to fear they will ſacrifice ſo many, and ſo great Advantages, to gratify the Will of one Man. But, if, in a ſudden Fit of Jealouſy, we ſhould treat them, as is by this Law propoſed, like Perſons already convicted, there is no knowing what they might do; but we may very eaſily know, that under Colour of avoiding, we had done our utmoſt to pull down the Miſchief, of which we are moſt afraid, and to bring that about, which otherwiſe could never have happened.

It may be alledged, that, according to this Manner of arguing, all our modern Patriots are miſtaken to a Man, and know not what they are about, which their known Wiſdom and Prudence, and above all their boaſted

Dexterity

Dexterity in the Management of the beſt conducted Oppoſition the World ever ſaw, [I uſe the Phraſe of the late Viſcount *B*——] will not allow us to believe. But to this I anſwer, that as great Men as they have been miſtaken. *Pym*, *Hampden*, and *Hollis*, were miſtaken; one ſaw his Miſtake upon his Death-bed, another died miſtaken, and the third lived to make amends for his Miſtake. All Men are fallible, Patriots as well as Miniſters of State; neither is there any Sort of Men, that I know of, ſo liable to be miſtaken, as thoſe who are governed by their Paſſions and Prejudices, which is viſibly enough their Caſe. Let them look to that.

Beſides, if they are ſuch great Politicians, it is very poſſible they may not be miſtaken; they may look upon the Bill in the ſame Light that I do, and promote it for all that; they will not be the firſt Stateſmen who have pretended one Thing, and in reality intended another: And, if I might ſpeak freely, I perſuade myſelf, it would be no hard Matter to gueſs at the true Deſign of puſhing this Bill. When I ſay this, I do not mean the true Deſign of the whole Party, but of thoſe who manage and lead the Party; or rather, who drive them like Sheep to Market, in order to make the moſt of their Fleeces, and Skins. Some, who ſuffer not a Seſſion of Parliament to paſs, without

mouthing

mouthing at the *Civil Liſt*, promiſed to have procured a greater, provided they might be Miniſters inſtead of Patriots. Who knows what's in the Wind now?

A certain Stateſman, in the Reign of King *Charles* II, voted for the *Bill of Excluſion* in the Houſe of Lords, and loſt his Place: A little after, he went to the Duke of *York*'s Court, and demanded an Audience, which was granted. Our great Maſter of his Art undertook to convince his Royal Highneſs, that in giving his Voice to exclude him from the Throne, he did him Service. He reaſoned thus; The King, *ſaid he*, is inclined to go into any thing that Faction may deſire, except an *Act of Excluſion*; it is neceſſary therefore to keep them up to this Demand, to prevent your coming to the Crown under a Multitude of Reſtrictions, to which your Brother would agree. This was a ſhrewed Turn, and it ſerved his Purpoſe who uſed it; the Duke believed him, and he paſſed immediately from the Character of a moſt notorious Malecontent, into that of a Miniſter of the Cabinet.

Some moderate and ſenſible People, who, generally ſpeaking, know what they ſay, pretend to tell us with Reſpect to this *Place-Bill*; that when it ſhall have anſwered it's Purpoſe [of turning the preſent Patriots into Miniſters] it will then be repealed, or at leaſt

leaſt greatly ſoftened. This they ſpeak of as an allowable Expedient, juſtified by the Conduct of former Oppoſitions; and indeed it muſt be owned, that our Conſtitution has ſuffered more from the Eagerneſs of Oppoſitions, and the Whims put by them into the Heads of the People, than from any other Cauſe. Mr *Montague*, afterwards Lord *Halifax*, was, at the Time it took place, as much decry'd for the *Recoynage*, as another Miniſter for the *Exciſe*. A Sea Officer's turning Pirate after Lord *Somers* had ſealed his Commiſſion was made uſe of to deſtroy that great Miniſter; and every body knows, that the Cry of the *Church* being in Danger, forced out the great and good Earl of *Godolphin*, and brought not only us, but the greateſt Part of *Europe*, into a Situation ſo bad, that we have not recovered from it to this very Day.

But, for Heaven's Sake, Sir, Let us have no more of theſe Experiments! If once in twenty Years the diſcontented undermine, or blow up, a Part of our Conſtitution, in order to diſlodge the then Miniſtry, we ſhall in Time, aye, and in a ſhort Time too, have no Conſtitution at all. Such Practices may indeed ſhew the Skill of theſe State-Engineers, who, by uſing their Arts among our Enemies, might do us excellent Service; but to treat the Government at home every Seſſion

ſion of Parliament, as Boys do Cocks on *Shrove-Tueſday*, for their own Emolument, and the Diverſion of the Mob, is what will never go down with the ſoberer Part of Mankind, ſuch as we ought to hope will always make the Majority of the Nation.

Add to this, the dreadful Proſpect we muſt have, if ſuch Perſons ſhould ever carry their Point, and force themſelves into Power. In ſuch a Caſe, the Crown muſt neceſſarily diſtruſt them, and the Voice of the People, being a Support never long to be relied on, theſe Stateſmen muſt have Recourſe to liſting a Party, ſufficient to maintain them in Spight of Diſtruſt on one Side, and of a juſt Averſion, when the People recover their Wits, and diſcover what Tools they have been made, on the other. Such was the Caſe of the motley Miniſtries King *William* was compell'd to make uſe of; ſuch was the Caſe of the Tory Miniſtry, in the laſt four Years of the Queen; and ſuch was the Caſe of another Miniſtry I could name, if it was proper. Our preſent Patriots are certainly great Men; but great as they are, they cannot alter the Nature of Things; they can interpoſe Nothing between Cauſes and Events; what has been, will be, in Spight of their Arts; and therefore, I lay it down, as a Thing certain, that

if

if ever they do get into Power, this will be the Conſequence.

Such, Sir, are the Motives which lead me to look upon the Place-Bill as an Engine of Faction brought to play upon the Conſtitution, in order to force the preſent Miniſtry to ſurrender. It is not perſonal Attachment to them; it is not the Force of Corruption; it is not any private or ſecret View whatever, that hath engaged me in the Detection of this Meaſure; but it is the Love of my Country, and Affection for the People, and a deep Concern for our Poſterity. Alas, Sir, what have the Majority, what have ninety-nine in a Hundred of this Nation to do with who is in Power, or who is out? It is not ſo much out of Reſpect to the Crown, as out of Regard to their own Eaſe and Benefit, that the People have left the executive Part of the Government to the King; reſerving to themſelves that Power which they are beſt able to manage, of accuſing, by their Repreſentatives, ſuch Miniſters as, by abuſing their Power, render the Government grievous to the People; and this Prerogative of accuſing (for that is as much the People's Prerogative, as pardoning is the Crown's) hath received an additional Force, ſince the Revolution, by the legal Conceſſion of the Crown, that no Pardon

ſhall avail or be pleadable againſt an Impeachment.

How ample, how permanent would the Happineſs of this Nation be, if our Inclinations bore but any Proportion to our Conſtitution. If the King would be content with his Power, the Lords with their Juriſdiction, and the Commons with their Privileges; but ſo it is, that ſome or other of theſe are always for encroaching. We have formerly had ambitious Kings; arrogant, oppreſſive, and rebellious Lords; and in the Days of our immediate Anceſtors, reſtleſs, unruly, and diſtracted Commons. All theſe, whenever they carried their Point, became Tyrants; but the worſt of all Tyrannies was the laſt. Yet in ſpight of Reaſon, in ſpight of Experience, in ſpight of the Dangers which threaten us from abroad, too many of us are ready at the Beck of a few deſigning Men to begin the ſame Game again, and to ſet up the Place-Bill in 1741, as the pretended Patriots did the perpetuating Bill in 1641; for there is no governing Mobs with out Idols. Here let me leave this unpleaſing Subject, and paſs to that of the War, once the Object of the Peoples Wiſhes, and now, as your Friends ſay, of their Reſentment.

It is univerſally agreed, that the Conduct of foreign Affairs is by much the moſt difficult Part of a Miniſter's Employment, and therefore

therefore on this Side all Miniſtries, amongſt us eſpecially, are firſt attacked. To ſay the Truth it is ſimply impoſſible for any Miniſter, how wiſe or upright ſoever, to manage Things ſo as to content a whole Nation in this Reſpect; neither is it his Buſineſs. He is not to conſult Popularity, but the true Intereſt of the People; an ill-grounded Impeachment, in the Eyes of Poſterity, does a Man more Honour than the Voice of publick Applauſe, gained by a weak Concurrence with common Opinions. In ſpeaking of foreign Affairs, the Enemies of a Miniſter have vaſt Advantages, whereas his Friends, nay and himſelf have inſuperable Difficulties to ſtruggle with. He who ſpeaks or writes againſt him, thinks himſelf at Liberty to ſuggeſt whatever may ſerve his Purpoſe, tho' he knows it to be falſe. A Miniſter, or the Friends of a Miniſter, dare not, for the Nation's Sake, aſſert the contrary of theſe Charges, though they know the contrary to be true.

It is with the foreign Affairs as with Natural Philoſophy, one Syſtem is admirable till another appears; and in aſſerting either, Men do not ſo much follow the Light of Reaſon, as the Impetus of their own Paſſions. Probable Things may be ſaid on all Sides; and, which is ſtrictly true, though it

may ſeem a little ſtrange, that Syſtem is commonly moſt plauſible which is at the bottom leaſt practicable; and therefore Miniſters are commonly run down for preferring Subſtance to Show. We need only run over in our Minds the ſeveral Charges brought againſt Miniſters ſince the Reſtauration, to be convinced of this, and conſequently to render us cautious in deciding.

The Earl of *Clarendon* was ruined under Pretence of his having ſold *Dunkirk*, promoting the *Portugal* Match, and being the great Inſtrument in the *Dutch* War: His Anſwer to theſe Charges was burnt, to prevent the Trouble of replying; and it has ſince appeared that he oppoſed the Sale of *Dunkirk*, that he did not propoſe the Match with *Portugal*, and that he was not particularly concerned in puſhing the King on a *Dutch* War. In the ſame Reign the Earl of *Danby*, afterwards Duke of *Leeds*, and a great Inſtrument in the Revolution, was, through *French* Influence, accuſed of being in the *French* Intereſt; and if he had not been a Man of very great Parts, had in all Probability ſuffered for promoting what in fact he laboured all he could to prevent. In the Reign of King *William*, every body knows that Impeachments were the Weapons rather of private Revenge, than of juſt

and

and publick Reſentment. All the Hiſtories we have of thoſe Times agree in repreſenting theſe Things in this Light; nor is there any Man who queſtions that the violent Proceedings againſt the Earl of *Hallifax*, Lord *Somers*, and the reſt of the Miniſters at the Cloſe of King *William*'s Reign, was the mere Effect of Party Rage, and the View ſome Men had of getting into Power. This appeared moſt plainly in the Treaty of *Utrecht*, negotiated by the great Promoters of thoſe Impeachments, on the Plan of that very Treaty on Account of which theſe Lords were impeached.

Whoever conſiders theſe Matters, cooly and with Attention, muſt diſcover that, with a general Knowledge of the Affairs of *Europe*, and a particular Acquaintance with our publick Tranſactions, it is no difficult Matter for a Man of a malicious Wit to frame ſuch a Charge againſt a Miniſter, with Reſpect to foreign Affairs, as ſhall be ſufficient to raiſe a Clamour againſt him; eſpecially if there be, as there always will be in *Britain*, a Party previouſly prejudiced againſt him, and deſirous of wreſting the Power out of his Hands. There is therefore no concluding rationally, from what is called common Fame, in Affairs of this Nature; for as the moſt innocent Man may be accuſed,

cuſed, ſo a general Accuſation ought to affect no Miniſter, till it be ſupported by Proofs, that is, by legal Proofs in ſuch a Way of Examination as is warranted by our Conſtitution. All other Charges are vague and impertinent; and as, on the one Hand, they may contain juſt Matter of Impeachment, ſo on the other they may alſo be perfect Chimæras, mere Inventions of envious Men, who to conſole themſelves in a low Eſtate would willingly have a Hand in pulling down others.

When Things were at a Criſis between us and *Spain*, that Meaſure was entered upon which has been ſince ſo violently decried, I mean the Convention. Yet whoever will have the Patience to conſider it, with that Attention which is neceſſary to judge of it, muſt ſee that it has done us much Good and no Hurt. There was a Neceſſity of convincing all *Europe*, that we entered into the War on juſt Grounds, and that we did not enter upon it till we had no other Means of doing ourſelves Juſtice. Our ſaying this would have ſignified nothing; Parties are ſeldom believed in their own Cauſe, but in this Caſe we make uſe of the Teſtimony of our Enemies, of all others the beſt Kind of Evidence. The Convention ſhows, that in the Judgment of *Spain* herſelf,

herſelf, we were grievouſly injured; the Convention ſhews, that for the Sake of preſerving the Peace of *Europe*, we were willing to be content with a ſmall Reparation, provided we had full Security for the Time to come; the Convention ſhews that the preſent War was unavoidable on our Side, nor do I know how, without the Convention, theſe Things could otherwiſe have been ſhown.

Thoſe who made that *Convention*, knew well, that however juſt our Quarrel was with *Spain*, yet when we were actually engaged in a War, many, or rather moſt, of the Powers of *Europe* would be alarmed at the Progreſs of our Arms, and incline to think it their Intereſt, to have Peace reſtored on Terms not fit for us to accept; whereas now, the Juſtice of our Quarrel, and the Nature of that Satisfaction which muſt be given us, before we ſheathe our Swords, is ſo well known to the World, that there can be no Diſputes about it; and after having taken theſe Precautions, to prevent any Aſperſions on the Juſtice of the Nation, it appears clearly, the Adminiſtration will admit of no Diſputes; but perſiſt in refuſing all Propoſals, ſhort of that Plan preſcribed by the two Houſes.

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The Inſtructions given to Admiral *Vernon*, and in Conſequence of which he has acted vigorouſly in the *Weſt-Indies*, were wiſely calculated, to try whether a gentle Chaſtiſement would not bring the *Spaniards* to their Wits, or oblige their politick Friends to adviſe them better. But while the Effects of theſe Proceedings were expected, other Precautions were not neglected. A Fleet was kept in the *Mediterranean*, to protect our Poſſeſſions, to diſtreſs the Enemy's Trade, and to ſecure our own. Proper Care alſo was taken to equip a greater Force, that when it became abſolutely neceſſary to exert ourſelves in a higher Degree, we might be able to do it, without any Apprehenſions, let the State of *Europe* be what it would. And though it be true, that our Deſigns were in ſome Meaſure fruſtrated by the Intervention of Providence; yet it is as true, that we have prevented the Deſigns of our concealed Enemies, by the wiſe Meaſures which have been ſince purſued by our Adminiſtration, and are ſtill able to carry into Execution all that a cool Reſentment can dictate.

There is a mighty Difference between the Notions entertained by private Men of the proper Management of a War, and thoſe that muſt be entertained by a Miniſtry who

who know what they are doing, muſt be accountable for what they do. An angry Perſon, in his Cloſet, may draw up Projects for invading this Place, and bombarding that. A Merchant, who has unfortunately loſt a Ship, may reſolve the whole Conduct of the War into guarding againſt Privateers; and a romantic Admirer of ſettling the Balance of Power, may be for laying Trains, and ſpringing Mines in all Parts of *Europe*, that the Flame of War may become general. It coſts theſe People Nothing, let what will become of their Schemes; but it is quite otherwiſe with the Miniſtry, their Fame and their Fortune, their publick and their private Characters, all they can hold dear or ſacred, is at Stake; and we muſt not only believe them the worſt, but the weakeſt of Men, if, in ſuch a Situation, they act precipitately, or even without the utmoſt Circumſpection.

That the Management of the preſent War is a Point not haſtily to be decided on, may appear from hence; that there can be nothing more diſtant than the Judgments framed of it at home and abroad. Your Friends, who never think the Miniſtry in the right in any thing they do, exclaim againſt it as manifeſtly wrong, as carried on with much Coldneſs and Indif-

ference. They ſay, that we have had needleſs Embargoes; that due Care has not been taken to protect our Merchants Ships; and that notwithſtanding our great Fleets, the *Spaniards* have not been much diſtreſſed; beſides a thouſand other invidious Stories, which have been invented and trumpeted about with equal Malice, merely to alarm the Credulous, and inflame the Vulgar.

On the other hand, foreign Princes and States have conſidered our Conduct in quite another Light, and though they ſee that our Projects were lately diſconcerted by the Winds, yet they ſee alſo, with Amazement mixed with Terror, that we have ſtill ſuch a Force on foot, as is ſufficient to execute the great Deſigns that have been formed, in Spight of any Oppoſition we may meet with. At home ſome People talk of declining Commerce, and of Trade every Day decaying; but abroad, we are not only admitted to be the greateſt Traders in the World, but are ſuppoſed to be graſping at the whole Trade of the *Weſt-Indies*. In other Caſes, Strangers are allowed to be the beſt Judges between contending Parties; but in this, the Malecontents will never allow it: They muſt believe all the World to be blind, or they muſt confeſs themſelves to be ſo.

I might

I might add, to what I have already ſaid, ſome Remarks on the wild Behaviour of our Patriots, with Reſpect to Admiral *Vernon*, whom they will divide from the Miniſtry, merely becauſe he has done his Duty. He declar'd, when he was before *Carthagena*, that he had Orders to reduce that Place: From whom had he thoſe Orders; from a Miniſtry not in earneſt? Can there be any Thing in Nature more abſurd, than to cry up a Man to the Skies for obeying Command, and at the ſame Time damning to the Pit of Hell thoſe who command him. When Admiral *Norris* embarked, the Patriots claimed him too; but after the Accident that happened to the *Victory*, they relinquiſhed him: and thus no doubt it will be, through the whole Courſe of the War. But, can you expect, Sir, that when the People of *Britain* recover themſelves, and think freely, they will continue to receive ſuch Abſurdities for Articles of Faith; if you do, you muſt be very ſanguine indeed, and you muſt allow that Prejudice to Power is not inferior even to Enthuſiaſm itſelf.

But to come to the main Point, the War we are engaged in affects, in a very different Manner, the honeſt well-meaning People of *Great Britain*, and the Faction headed by your Friends, which I allow to be

numerous, but not ſo numerous as they are noiſy. The People of *Britain*, in general, have their Trade, their Safety, and their Reputation at Stake; they pay the Taxes, which muſt ſupport this War, and they are ſtrongly intereſted in it's Event. It is therefore natural for them to deſire it may be carried on in ſuch a Manner, as that it may be quickly ended, and a ſafe and laſting Peace ſucceed. But, it is quite otherwiſe with the Malecontents; they conſider the War in no other Light, than as it favours their Deſigns; and will eſteem it ſucceſsful, not in Proportion to the Advantages we gain, or the Miſchief done our Enemies; but, as it leſſens the Intereſt of the Miniſtry, and promotes their own; and therefore, we are never to expect that theſe Men ſhould be pleaſed with the Manner in which it is carried on, becauſe all they aim at is to carry it on themſelves.

We had various Specimens of this froward Humour in the laſt Seſſion of Parliament, ſufficient to open the Eyes of all who were inclined to ſee; but you know, there are ſome blinder than the Blind, and they no doubt will ſtill go on in the ſame Way; that is, they will cry aloud for vigorous Meaſures, and yet find ſome Pretence or other, for oppoſing every vigorous Meaſure that is taken;

taken; as in the Caſe of the *Marines.* They will put the worſt Conſtructions poſſible, whenever we do not meet with Succeſs; and where we are ſucceſsful, they will aſcribe it to the Commanders, and yet charge it on the Miniſtry as a Crime, that better Meaſures were not taken, even for obtaining ſuch Succeſs. This you know was done in the famous Motion as to the taking *Porto-Bello,* which, after a vaſt Expence of Eloquence, was given up, as not reconcileable either to Senſe or Grammar. They will except to the Expence of the War, though there is no War we can ſo eaſily bear, as a Naval one, however expenſive. In ſhort, they will exert their utmoſt Skill, in order to make the War as uſeful to them as they can; and if after all they fail in this, they will turn their Tone, and accuſe the Miniſtry of being no Lovers of Peace, as the *French* have already done in their *Manifeſto.*

The modern Practice of preferring Debates to Conſultations, deſtroys in a great Meaſure the excellent Intention of our moſt auguſt Aſſemblies, and ſerves too frequently, to reſolve ſage Advice into fruitleſs Diſcourſe. This in time becomes the Fate of every Science, as well as Politicks; and, in it's Turn, hath affected all free Governments, as well as ours. As the Reputation of any Branch

Branch of Knowledge increaſes, the Number of thoſe, who would diſtinguiſh themſelves therein, increaſes likewiſe; and this begets Queſtions, Arguments, and Diſputes, which all tend, rather to improve the Art of Controverſy, than that Art to which they are more immediately thought to relate. In *Greece*, in *Carthage*, and in *Italy*, the Age of Orators was always an Age of Confuſion; and indeed, it will ever be ſo, where great Attention is paid to florid Diſcourſes; there being nothing in Nature which hinders a Man of foul Principles from becoming a fine Speaker.

The preſent State of our Affairs, and eſpecially the preſent State of the War, requires another Sort of Conduct, in order to bring it to a proſperous Iſſue; I mean an Iſſue proſperous to the Nation in general, thoſe who bear the Expences of the Government, and to whom, as we are free, the Government itſelf is accountable. Diſputes and Cavils at this Time of Day can only tend to produce Miſtakes, if there has been none, and to render their Conſequences more fatal, if there has. This may be pleaſing to a Party, who delight in nothing ſo much as hitting Blots, and may be ſerviceable to ſuch as aim at making a Change in the Miniſtry; but, as I ſhall hereafter ſhow, this muſt

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at preſent be extremely prejudicial to the publick Intereſt, and cannot poſſibly produce any future Advantages. The only Meaſure that can be of uſe to us in this nice Conjuncture is Unanimity, and a hearty Deſire, in all Parties, to ſerve their Country firſt, by doing whatever ſhall be expedient to bring this War to a happy Concluſion; and then ſerve themſelves, by enquiring into Miſtakes and Miſmanagements. We ſhall always be Maſters at home; the Point now under our Care is not to be maſtered abroad.

I know very well that the general Opinion is, the *Spaniards* have no Capacity of contending with us, but that we might have cruſhed them long ago, if we had really intended ſo to do: Perhaps it may be ſo, but Miniſters ought always to conſider Conſequences. The avowed parliamentary Deſign of this War, was not the utter Deſtruction of our Enemies, but the Reparation of ourſelves; which I conceive will not be much facilitated by the Ruin of thoſe who are to repair us.

The preſent Syſtem of Affairs in *Europe* is certainly not ſo favourable to us as we could wiſh; though we have but one declared Enemy, we have ſeveral ſecret ones; and amongſt many Allies, we have few, who either can, or are inclined to act like

Friends

Friends to us in this Diſpute. The late Peace between the Emperor and *France* was projected at *Rome*, and was intended as the Baſis of a Catholick Alliance. It has ſerved therefore as one of the great Motives to *Spain* to act as ſhe has done, from a Perſwaſion that ſhe ſhould eaſily find Friends, whereas it would be difficult for us to do ſo. The *French* and *Dutch* are deeply intereſted in the Trade of the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; and it is ſcarce to be expected, that either of theſe Nations ſhould ſacrifice her own Intereſt, or what ſhe takes to be her own Intereſt, to ours. In the North we have one firm Ally, and, but for the Hand of Providence, we ſhould by this Time have had another. This I take to be a clear and conciſe State of Things, I am ſure it is a very impartial one; for as I take the beſt Care I can, not to be impoſed on myſelf, ſo I have no View, no Deſire, to impoſe upon others.

There are ſome amongſt us, who have taken a great deal of Pains to exaggerate theſe Things, and to charge all the Inconveniencies that preſs us, either at home, or abroad, upon the Adminiſtration; nay, upon a ſingle Perſon in the Adminiſtration, who, they ſay, has blunder'd us into them by his Negotiations. But ſure, a Man muſt want

want common Senſe, who, on the ſlighteſt Review, cannot diſcern this to be a groſs and abſurd Calumny. Is he chargeable with that warm Spirit of Catholick Piety, which reigns in the three great Courts of *Europe?* Is he chargeable with that claſhing in a trading Intereſt, which hinders our natural Allies from ſeeing, with that Satisfaction they otherwiſe would do, our Capacity and Inclination to right ourſelves in the *Weſt-Indies?* Is he chargeable with the long Continuance of croſs Winds, and croſſer Accidents, which occaſion'd new Difficulties no human Underſtanding could foreſee; or if they had been revealed to him, could not poſſibly have been by him prevented? In a Word, is he chargeable with the Source of all theſe Miſchiefs, the Notions *Geraldino* conceived of our domeſtick Diſſenſions, and which, with the Aſſiſtance of ſome who might be named, he impreſſed on the Minds of the principal Miniſters at the Court of *Madrid?* No, certainly, theſe are Things for which he is not accountable. But one Thing is his Due, and ought for ever to be remembered of him, that we have at this Inſtant at Sea, Fleets ſufficient to execute ſeveral great, ſubſtantial Deſigns, notwithſtanding ſo many unlooked-for Accidents, maugre all the Clamour of our Male-contents at home,

and notwithſtanding all the Fraud and Force of our artificial Enemies abroad. But I am entering into Matters not ſo proper for the Letter of a private Man, his Defence will always ſuffer in any Language but his own, ſtrong as his Reaſon, and clear as his Innocence.

The Situation we are now in renders it evident, that it will depend upon the Concluſion of this War, whether we ſhall be the firſt, or the laſt Nation in *Europe*, whether we ſhall be conſidered as a grave, ſteady, and magnanimous, or as a fickle, factious, and reſtleſs People. If we carry the great Point we contend for, of fixing our Navigation in the *Weſt-Indies*, beyond the reach of future Cavils and Diſputes; and if in the Courſe of the War, our Subjects in thoſe Parts, reap extraordinary Advantages in Trade; and, in conſequence of our military Operations, it will be allowed that all is done that could be humanly expected, and in ſucceeding Times the Terror of the *Britiſh* Naval Force will be much greater than ever: *Britain* may then be truly ſtiled Empreſs of the Ocean, for we ſhall then have given Laws to our Enemies in the Sight of all *Europe*, and this notwithſtanding the Arts that have been uſed to conſtrue general Treaties of Peace into Guarantees

rantees for lawleſs Depredations. We ſhall have done all this coolly and reſolutely, without aſking the Aid, or fearing the Reſentment of any other Power, and at a Time when our Enemies would have perſwaded the World, we were in no Condition to perform the leaſt of theſe great Things.

But, in order to exert ourſelves thus glorioufly abroad, there muſt be Peace, there muſt be Tranquillity, at home; Faction muſt ſuſpend it's Rage, and, if it be poſſible, Envy ſhould ceaſe to hiſs; but, at leaſt, there ought to be Quiet in the State, and Unity in our Councils. He who promotes theſe is a Friend to the Arms of *Great Britain*, and he who does not is a Friend to the *Spaniards*, whatever violent Things he may think fit to ſay againſt them; for it is well known we have but too many *Sempronii* amongſt us. I am very ſenſible that ſome will call this Sort of Reaſoning, pleading for Time, and endeavouring to ſooth the Paſſions of the People: But, in Truth, Sir, I have no View but the great one, of endeavouring to convince ſome Folks of their Miſtakes, and thereby ſerving my Country in general. In order to convince you of this, permit me to ſhew you how far, even on the Principles of your Friends, my Pro-

poſal muſt appear reaſonable: For they muſt be ſtrange Men indeed who will neither be made ſenſible by their Opponent's Arguments, nor be brought to conſider impartially the Force and Weight of their own. This would be a political Obſtinacy ſo ſhameful, that I cannot ſuſpect it in *Engliſhmen*, and therefore I confeſs I do not proceed altogether without Hopes.

If Diſputes about the Place-Bill, and tedious Enquiries into other Matters, ſhould break in upon the Councils, which ought to intend the Management of the preſent War. If theſe or other ſuch like Controverſies ſhould ſowre the Minds, and turn the Heads of the People, ſo as to divert them from the great Point they ought to have in View. If inſtead of Loyalty, Induſtry, and Application, Jealouſy, Sedition, and a factious Humour of Parliamentering, ſhould be preached up, the natural Conſequence will be, that our martial Spirit will evaporate, our open Enemies will take Heart, our concealed ones renew their Intrigues; and in ſuch a Situation, what can become of the War in the Hands of any Miniſter whatever. Self Preſervation is the firſt Law of Nature, and a Law that cannot be diſpenſed with; in ſuch a Caſe the Adminiſtration muſt certainly look to itſelf, and as they are but Men, I do not ſee how

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we can expect they ſhould with equal Succeſs defend themſelves againſt their perſonal Enemies at Home, and triumph over the Enemies of the Publick abroad. Such a Thing may be poſſible, but I think it would ſcarce be prudent, even in the Male-Contents, to run the Hazard; for if the Adminiſtration ſhould ſucceed, theirs would be a loſt Game, the Oppoſition would be for ever demoliſhed, and *B——ke* himſelf might turn loyal.

On the other Hand, ſhould we turn the Tables, and ſuppoſe that in Conſequence of Place-Bills, Riots, Complaints about Privateers, and twenty other ſuch Expedients, a Change in the Miniſtry could be brought about. Can you, Sir, or can any Man believe, that the War will go on the better for it? Is there any Inſtance in Hiſtory that can be produced to favour ſuch an Opinion, or the Shadow of an Argument capable of ſupplying the Want of Experience? If you ſuppoſe that the new Miniſtry would purſue the ſame Deſigns with the old, this is ſuppoſing, in other Words, that no Change is neceſſary; but if you believe, as I dare ſay you do, that they would act entirely on Plans of their own, then Nothing but Confuſion could enſue from ſuch ſudden and thorough Alterations. New Schemes would naturally require new Officers, new Officers would want the Lights

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and Experience of their Predeceſſors, many Interruptions would all this occaſion, and without the Interpoſition of Miracles, the moſt ſanguine Malecontent in the Kingdom could ſcarce hope any Good from ſuch a Management of the War. I am confident, if you reflect a Moment, you will own that I have handled the Pencil tenderly, and not painted this Scene near ſo ſtrongly as I might have done; to tell you the Truth I was afraid of frighting my Readers, and that is rather the Province of your Friends than mine.

If therefore, as all Parties agree, this War is of ſuch high Importance; if, as I have already proved, nothing ſhort of univerſal Harmony can contribute to it's happy Concluſion; ſure all true Patriots, all who prefer the thing to the Name, and are fond rather of ſerving their Country, than of ſpeeching for it, will concur in promoting ſuch an Union as they are convinced is neceſſary. To act otherwiſe is to act rather like an Incendiary than a Patriot, and he who at ſuch a Time as this ſtirs the Coals of Sedition, and prompts his weaker, though well-meaning, Neighbours to diſturb the Peace of their Country, while they vainly fancy they are doing it Service, ſhews himſelf more a *Spaniard* than a *Briton*, if we judge of Men as we ought to do, by their Deeds rather than by their Words.

Such

Such a Man may talk of Influence, and rail at Corruption, but it will be plain that he has the Seeds of both lurking in his Heart, and every true Judge of Mankind will not heſitate to declare that he is influenced by his Prejudices, and corrupted by his Expectations.

With great Concern I ſpeak it, there is more of Corruption amongſt your Friends, the pretended Patriots, than I have ever obſerved amongſt any Miniſtry, or their Dependants, ſince I can remember. To ſay the Truth, that Coalition of Parties, of which you boaſt ſo much, is in itſelf the groſſeſt, and vileſt Corruption; it is a Term made Uſe of to ſignify thoſe fallacious Arts, thoſe fraudulent Contrivances, by which a few of your Chiefs have drawn a large Body of People of different Sentiments to concur in promoting their Deſigns. I know you, Sir, to be too penetrating a Perſon not to diſcern the Truth of what I ſay. You cannot but know that the Jacobites are told one Thing, the diſcontented Whigs another, and the Diſſenters a third, while at the bottom, you deſign to ſerve them all alike; that is to ſerve yourſelves at their Expence. Is this acting like Patriots, is this treating them like *Britons*, or can Men who act in this Manner talk of Influence and Corruption without feeling a Bluſh in their Cheeks? If they can, I am

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ſure they are much loſt to Shame, and nothing but repeated Diſappointments, which I believe they are in a fair Way of meeting, will reclaim them.

The Truſt repoſed in you as a Member of Parliament is a very great one, it is the greateſt Truſt that can be repoſed in a Freeborn *Briton*; I wiſh you may always remember this, and never have any other Biaſs in the Diſcharge of it, than the Remembrance of the Honour your Country has done you, in making Choice of you for its Repreſentative. But conſider, Sir, if this be ſo great, ſo weighty, ſo important an Office, it muſt require Thought and Attention in the Performance of it. It is not going the Lengths of a Party, it is not joining with thoſe who proclaim themſelves Patriots, it is not railing at Miniſters, or refuſing Places from the Crown, that ſimply and alone makes a Man a good Member: But it is a Diſpoſition to conſider the publick Affairs candidly, to abhor Prejudice as much as a Penſion, and to have an equal Deteſtation of a groundleſs Oppoſition to, as for a ſlaviſh Dependance on a Court. Theſe, Sir, are the Qualifications of a true Patriot, of ſuch a one as approves himſelf to his own Conſcience, and to the judging few, who deſpiſes this Character from the

the Rabble, becauſe he knows them to be incompetent Judges.

Alcibiades among the *Athenians*, and *Marius* among the *Romans*, were popular for a Time, and Tyrants in Right of their Popularity. But *Phocion* and *Cato* the younger, who were truly Patriots, cared very little for the Applauſe of the People, though no Men of their Time cared ſo much for their Safety. It has been the ſame Thing with our *Engliſh* Patriots; thoſe who have ſtudied to be thought ſo, ſeldom proved ſuch in reality, and thoſe who actually came up to the Character never had the Vanity to aſſume it. It is a good Obſervation of Lord *Clarendon*, that when Mr *Pym* went all the Lengths of Popularity, he was heard with Attention and Applauſe; but when he would have acted the Patriot indeed, when he would have poured Wine and Oil into the Wounds of his bleeding Country, then his Eloquence would do little; he had a Power of doing Miſchief, but none of doing Good. The beſt Patriot our Hiſtory records is Sir *William Temple*, and he was a Courtier and a Miniſter, ſo long as in thoſe Capacities he could ſerve his Country; moderate in his Sentiments, grave in his Language, he never ſpoke but to recommend Peace, and never acted but in hopes of contributing to it; he was loyal to his Maſter, and

at the ſame Time faithful to his Country, he made no Diſtinction between their Service, and he had an ill Opinion of all who did Forgive me, Sir, placing theſe Pictures in your Sight, but believe me, Sir, they are as well worth your contemplating, as thoſe of *Sejanus* or *Wolſey*, Sir *E. S.* or Sir *W. W.* After looking ſo long on falling Miniſters and famous Speakers, it will do you no hurt, if you turn your Eyes on Pieces of a milder Kind. Once more I aſk your Pardon for this Digreſſion that I may return to, and conclude, the Subject on which I have adventured to write.

The coming Seſſion, it is ſaid, will be a very buſy one, and ſo in the Nature of Things it muſt be; but I perſuade myſelf that all honeſt and thinking *Engliſhmen* deſire that Buſineſs may be done rather than talked of; there are many Matters of great Moment, which we have Reaſon to wiſh may be diſpatched, and it will give us juſt Cauſe of Concern, ſhould any of them be poſtponed for the Sake of gratifying the Lovers of Novelty and Noiſe; Men who are leaſt ſatisfied in Times of domeſtick Peace, and who place all their Pleaſure in creating and viewing Diſturbances. The Approach of Parliament is, and ought always to be, pleaſant to a free People, it is a Time wherein they have an

Opportunity

Opportunity of declaring their Grievances, and of obtaining Redreſs, wherein new Laws may be demanded where old ones are inſufficient, and where Application may be made for abating the Edge of ſuch as are found too ſevere. Reflect then, Sir, on the juſt Character of thoſe, who, as far as in their Power lies, attempt to deprive us of theſe Bleſſings, by diverting a great Part of that Time which is due to the Buſineſs of the Nation, to Party-Squabbles; weigh with yourſelf the Iniquity of impoſing on the common People, by dreſſing up pompous Propoſals, which at the Bottom mean nothing but to raiſe a Cry, and to invite a Multitude; remember how unfit a Seaſon this is for the Practice of ſuch Arts, when ſo many Things in our domeſtick Oeconomy claim our Attention, and we are engaged in a foreign War of ſuch mighty Conſequence. Add to all this the broken and unſettled State of *Europe*, the prodigious Strides our ambitious Neighbour has made of late Years, partly through her Union at Home, and partly through our Diſſenſions. Theſe are Proſpects which ought to render us ſerious, which ought to render us ſincere; let us then forget all factious Heat, and let us in our ſeveral Stations feel no other Biaſs, than that which is derived to us from our Affection to our Country,

Country, and the common Cauſe of Proteſtants.

Theſe, Sir, are no Inſtructions ſent either to awe or to prove you; they are the Sentiments of a private Perſon, who from Reſpect to you, and out of Zeal to the publick Service, thought it his Duty to lay them before you in this Manner; it remains with you to receive them as you think fit, but of this be aſſured, that amongſt the moſt noiſy of your Admirers, there is not one who is more truly, or with greater Affection,

SIR,

Your obedient humble Servant,